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Energy policy in the European Union: The power and 
limits of discourse 
 
 
Abstract: 
Since the 1990s, the European Commission has pushed for the liberalization of 
European electricity and gas markets, gradually linked energy and climate policies, 
and asked for a common voice in energy relations with third parties. This paper 
documents how the Commission constructed a “competitive, sustainable and secure 
(CSS)” frame in order to justify its intervention in a policy domain which member 
states used to consider as a purely domestic one. To analyze the effectiveness of 
this discursive strategy, I propose a simple model that includes the Commission’s 
framing (ideas), the Member State’s energy situation (interests), and the existence of 
an EU regulatory space (institutions). How these three elements combine, strengthen 
or undermine each other helps explain how far the Commission was able to push its 
agenda. Comparing Germany, France and Poland, I show that the Commission’s 
strategy was successful to the extent that it changed the discourse of member states. 
But due to important institutional and economic limits, policy implementation is 
uneven. Despite the Ukraine crisis, weak implementation remains striking with 
regards to energy external relations.  
 
Key words: 
European Union, energy policy, framing, France, Germany, Poland 
 
Résumé: 
Depuis les années 1990, la Commission européenne encourage la libéralisation des 
marchés d’électricité et de gaz, associe progressivement les politiques énergétique 
et climatique et réclame une voix commune dans les relations énergétiques avec les 
États tiers. Ce papier retrace la construction par la Commission d’un cadre 
« concurrence, soutenabilité, sécurité » devant lui permettra d’accroître sa marge de 
manœuvre dans un domaine politique traditionnellement considéré comme 
« national ». Pour comprendre l’efficacité de la stratégie discursive, j’analyse trois 
éléments : le cadrage de la Commission (idées), la situation énergétique des États 
membres (intérêts) et la présence d’un espace réglementaire commun (institutions). 
La manière dont ces trois éléments se combinent, se renforcent ou s’affaiblissent 
aide à comprendre jusqu’où la Commission a réussi à imposer son agenda. 
Comparant l’Allemagne, la France et la Pologne, le papier montre que la stratégie de 
la Commission a réussi dans la mesure où elle a modifié le discours des États 
membres. Toutefois, la mise en œuvre d’une politique énergétique européenne est 
inégale pour des raisons institutionnelles et économiques. Malgré la crise 
ukrainienne, les limites de la mise en œuvre demeurent frappantes dans les relations 
extérieures en matière d’énergie. 
Mots clés : 
Union européenne, politique énergétique, cadrage, France, Allemagne, Pologne 
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Introduction 
While energy has been a salient issue in Europe for a long time, specific concerns 
have shifted over time. The European Coal and Steel Community dealt with coal 
production, the main energy source after World War II. The European Atomic Energy 
Community, established a few years later, was created in the aftermath of the Suez 
crisis. Nuclear energy was then considered as an alternative to the decline of coal 
reserves and as a way to reduce dependence on foreign oil. The oil shock of the 
1970s put oil into focus and national energy policies were reorganized around 
national strategies of diversification. Energy policy issues lost some traction in the 
1980s, not least because of decreasing oil prices, but they have been back on the 
political agenda since the 1990. Since then, the European Commission has shown 
remarkable leadership, first in pushing for the creation of a internal energy market, 
then by linking issues of climate change, security of supply, and the need for 
coordinated external action. Today, the result of this leadership is mirrored in the 
Energy article of the Lisbon Treaty. 
As I argue in this paper, without having explicit powers with regard to energy, the 
Commission framed the need for a common energy policy by linking three issues 
that, initially, were not related and upon which the Commission had unequal 
authority: the internal market for energy, climate change, and external action with 
regard to security of supply. This is what I call the “CSS frame”, whereby the 
objective of energy policy is construed as being about creating a competitive, 
sustainable, and secure market. This innovative frame has allowed the Commission 
to set the agenda in the field of energy policy from the mid-1990s on. To a large 
degree, Member States have bought into this frame. The question I explore in this 
paper is whether this frame was also effective in transforming the energy policy field 
– from a mainly domestic to a supranational policy – within the EU. To do so I 
compare the resonance of the CSS frame and its implementation in three large 
European countries with very different energy situations: France, Germany, and 
Poland.  
To understand the effectiveness of a discursive strategy from agenda setting to 
policy implementation, I propose a simple model that includes three elements: the 
Commission’s framing (ideas), the Member State’s energy situation (interests), and 
the existence of an EU regulatory space (institutions). How these three elements 
combine, strengthen or undermine each other helps explain how far the Commission 
was able to push its agenda. Based on expert interviews in these countries and in 
Brussels, I argue that the CSS frame was successful to the extent that it has been 
taken over and incorporated in the everyday discourse of national policy makers. 
However, the CSS frame has been institutionalized to different degrees. The reason, 
I argue, is that the ambiguity of this frame has allowed national actors to emphasize 
the specific elements that were congruent with their national interests (Chester 
2010). More progress was made when the Commission had a preexisting institutional 
basis as in the case of the internal market, where it drew upon its competence in 
competition or managed to push legally binding targets through as in the case of 
climate change. But when it comes to external relations, the Commission was unable 
to force Member States to change their positions through framing.  
This argument is consistent with the literature on the role of ideas in public policy. 
The question I ask is not whether ideas matter, but how they matter (Blyth 2002, 
2003). As Metha (2011: 24) writes, an idea does “matter when it (a) shapes people’s 
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actions and (b) is not reducible to some other nonideational force”. For Metha, 
problem definition and framing are similar in that they limit a complex situation by 
stressing some elements, but they are different in that framing insists more on how to 
package preexisting ideas to gather support for one’s position. In that sense, a frame 
“point[s] to the cognitive process wherein people bring to bear background 
knowledge to interpret an event or circumstances and to locate it in a larger system 
of meaning. Framing processes are the ways actors invoke one frame or set of 
meanings rather than another when they communicate a message, thereby indicating 
how the message is to be understood” (Oliver and Johnston 2000: 45). With regard 
to energy policy, I look at the way different components – competition, sustainability, 
and security – are assembled and communicated to justify the need for common 
action.  
In line with the Europeanization literature, I also look at how a body like the European 
Commission mobilizes Member States in support of a common policy through soft 
instruments of persuasion. Although I recognize that the Commission is made up of 
technocrats, diplomats and politicians with different profiles and institutional interests 
(Smith and Joana, 2002), the EU executive is considered, for the purposes of this 
paper, as a black box, speaking with a single voice to Member States. Schmidt 
(2006) argues that EU leaders can push for Europeanization through a mix of 
communicative (i.e., political) and coordinating (i.e., technical) discourses. There is a 
long tradition, to which I subscribe, according to which ideas are more likely to be 
effective when they are congruent with either institutions or (material) interests, and 
ideally both (Hall 1993; Surel 2000). The interplay of these three elements in the 
process of Europeanization is what I am interested in. The analysis I put forward 
does not sequence the role of ideas, interests and institutions and refrains from 
prejudging their respective impact (Hassenteufel and Smith 2002; Palier and Surel 
2005).  
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the Commission’s framing has 
worked best when it could either resonate with strong domestic interests or rely on an 
institutionalized regulatory space. Although compatible with it, this argument is 
different from Natorski and Herranz Surrallés’ (2008) analysis of the EU’s energy 
policy framing, which focuses on energy security whereas I include economic and 
environmental attributes in the CSS frame. For Natorski and Herranz Surrallés, the 
Commission and the Parliament’s framing efforts, which they analyze as a 
securitization move in the Copenhagen school tradition, failed because it relied on 
too many “referent objects”: for instance, the economy, European consumers, or 
national electricity structures. In contrast to Natorski and Harranz Surrallés, I do not 
attribute the failure of the Commission’s framing effort to the ambiguity of the frame, 
which in fact probably helped Brussels’ case to a large extent. Rather, I argue that 
this ideational strategy reached important institutional and material limits.  
The paper is structured as follows: First, I outline the development of the European 
energy policy frame. Second, I analyze to what extent this discursive frame produced 
institutional results at the EU level. Third, I examine how Member State 
representatives interpret and use the frame today. The first two parts of the paper 
build on the analysis of official documents, whereas the third part refers to a case 
study that includes expert interviews conducted in three Member States, Germany, 
France and Poland, as well as in Brussels. 
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2. CSS: Framing a European energy policy 
While coal and nuclear issues topped the energy agenda in the early stages of 
European integration, oil dominated the agenda in the 1970s and 1980s. To protect 
economic activity from supply reduction and interruption, the Council of Ministers 
adopted a first directive (68/414/EEC) in 1968: Member States were asked to 
maintain a minimum stock of crude oil and/or petroleum products for 65 days of 
consumption. Growing concerns about import dependence let to an increase of this 
strategic reserve to 90 days in 1972 (directive 72/425/EEC). Similar measures to 
secure stocks of fossil fuels followed in 1973 (73/238/EEC) and 1975 (directive 
75/339/EEC) in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. The crisis also led to a growing 
intergovernmental cooperation that was institutionalized with the creation of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974. The impetus for this new institutional 
arrangement came from the US and not from the Europeans, who considered that it 
would be “useful to study with other oil-consuming countries within the framework of 
the OECD ways of dealing with the common short and long term energy problems of 
consumer countries” (European Communities 1974: 487-490). Throughout the 
1980s, energy policy in Europe focused basically on the reduction of oil imports from 
unstable producing countries; diversification was the key word for increasing energy 
security, but it was taken care of by the Member States.  
From the 1990s on, energy policy attention shifted to market issues: the restructuring 
of energy markets in a new geopolitical context remained on the political agenda for 
the next 20 years. On the one hand, there were negotiations about international 
energy cooperation, which began with a political declaration in 1991 and led to the 
signature of an Energy Charter that became effective in 1998. This legally binding 
treaty encourages investment and trade through common rules, to guarantee reliable 
cross-boarder energy transit and promote energy efficiency. It also aimed at 
integrating the energy sector of the former USSR into European and world markets 
(Energy Charter Secretariat 2004). The integration and restructuring of energy 
markets were supposed to generate stable conditions for investments and, ultimately, 
ensure energy security. 
On the other hand, the idea of the energy market as an instrument of energy security 
also emerged. For example, the Green Paper for a European Union Energy Policy, 
published in 1995, insisted that the establishment of market rules – contracts and 
conditions for investments – would contribute to energy security (European 
Commission 1995). The Green Paper and, even more, the White Paper on an 
Energy Policy for the European Union (European Commission 1996) that followed in 
1996 began to advocate the integration of both an environmental and an external 
dimension into energy policy. 
Even though environmental and foreign policies were referred to in the 1990s, it was 
the market issue that dominated the discussion. Despite controversy, the EU adopted 
its first directive concerning an internal electricity market in 1996 (Directive 
96/92/EC). It established a certain degree of third party access to electricity networks 
and put an end to construction monopolies of power lines and power stations. With 
this directive energy policy issues started moving from Member States towards the 
European level. Eising et Jabko (2001) point out that this shift was not “a foregone 
conclusion at the outset in the energy sector. When the European Commission 
introduced a working paper on the Internal Electricity Market (IEM) in 1988, it only set 
the relatively modest goal of achieving price transparency and freer transit of 
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electricity across borders. In fact, the prospect of a European energy policy had 
initially appeared so utopian that the electricity sector was simply not mentioned in 
the original 1985 White Paper on the Internal Market.” 
In search for a common energy policy, the Commission pursued the consolidation of 
the internal energy market in the 2000s. Most Member States had implemented the 
first directive by September 2000, but the Commission considered the progress 
made towards liberalization insufficient. Thus, a second energy package was 
proposed to complete the internal electricity and gas markets (directive 2003/54/EC 
for electricity and directive 2003/55/EC for gas). The directives’ objective was “to 
create conditions more conducive to genuine, fair competition and to put in place a 
true single market”.1 
Both these directives were replaced in 2009 by the ones following the third energy 
package: directive 2009/72/EC for electricity and directive 2009/73/EC for gas. 
Basically, the directives impose further requirements with regard to the unbundling of 
generation, transmission and distribution, impart more power of oversight and more 
cooperation among national regulators, and establish a European Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER).2 Since the first wave of liberalization 
rules, the Commission has attempted to break national and regional monopolies; 
these often vertically integrated electric utilities control prices on the wholesale 
market and prevent new market players from accessing the market. 
Energy policy related activities within the EU proliferated in the 2000s, as the number 
of strategic publications illustrate: the Green Paper Towards a European Strategy for 
the Security of Energy Supply (2000), the Green Paper A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy (2006), and the Green Paper Towards 
a Secure, Sustainable and Competitive European Energy Network (2008). Moreover, 
three Strategic Energy Reviews (2007, 2008 and the follow-up of 2009) were 
published. Underlying this discursive production was the argument, made explicit in 
the 2000 Green Paper, that “without an active energy policy, the European Union will 
not be able to free itself from its increasing energy dependence” (European 
Commission 2000: 2). 
Finally, the European Commission proposed a “climate and energy package” in 2008 
to implement the “20-20-20” targets by 2020, which imply the reduction of CO2 
emissions of at least 20% below the level of 1990, the increase of renewable energy 
to an amount of 20% of energy consumption in the EU, and the upgrade of energy 
efficiency to reduce the projected primary energy consumption by 20%.3 By 
accepting this “climate and energy package”, the Member States backed the 
Commission’s drive for a common energy policy and approved an explicit link 
between climate and energy policies. The European Council reconfirmed this linkage 
in 2014 by the approval of the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy, which 
includes the binding target of at least 40% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030 
(compared to 1990), a binding target of at least 27% of renewable energy used at the 
EU level, at least a 27% increase of energy efficiency, as well as the completion of 
the internal energy market (interconnection target of 15% between Member States).4 
                                            
1 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/internal_energy_market/l27005_en.htm (accessed January 29, 
2012. 
2http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/internal_energy_market/en0016_en.htm (accessed January 29, 
2012) 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/package_en.htm 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/2030_en.htm (accessed December 11, 2014) 
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In the first decade of the 21st century, the Commission also became increasingly 
vocal about the need for a common energy policy with regard to external relations. 
The 2000 Green Paper alludes to geopolitical issues in the Middle East and to the 
fact that the EU lacks the powers and means to “negotiate and exert pressure” 
(European Commission 2000: 28). The 2006 Green Paper reiterates this need: “The 
energy challenges facing Europe need a coherent external policy to enable Europe to 
play a more effective international role in tackling common problems with energy 
partners worldwide. A coherent external policy is essential to deliver sustainable, 
competitive, and secure energy. It would be a break from the past, and show 
Member States’ commitment to common solutions to shared problems” (European 
Commission 2006: 14). The call for an external energy policy was highlighted by the 
Russian cut-off of gas deliveries to Ukraine in early 2006. This incident illustrated 
Europe’s vulnerability with regard to energy supply and infrastructures. The fear of 
gas shortages across Europe helped to integrate the external policy dimension into 
the common European energy policy frame. 
The three dimensions – internal market, environment, and external relations – finally 
materialized in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which, for the first time, introduces energy as 
a “shared competence” (like the environment or the internal market), whereby 
Member States cannot exercise authority when the Union has done so. “Competitive, 
secure and sustainable” are used in almost every document produced by the 
Commission since the mid-2000s. In the development of this frame, “Kyoto” and 
“Moscow” were helpful external drivers (Convery 2009). More importantly, however, 
the very ambiguity of the CSS frame gave it a broad appeal reaching out to very 
different audiences, from large energy firms in Western Europe looking for 
geographical expansion to insecure political leaders in the Central Europe looking for 
guarantees vis-à-vis Russia, via German environmentalists. With CSS, the 
Commission managed to create a set of policy ideas that looks coherent: in this 
quasi-syllogism, sustainability is necessary to reduce insecurity, but competitiveness 
is necessary to tackle climate change (Wood 2010: 318). It is interesting to contrast 
Europe’s energy policy frame with its North American counterpart to emphasize the 
uniqueness of the packaging of ideas: in the US, the reference to sustainability is 
virtually absent, while the reference to both sustainability and security is negligible in 
energy policy discussions in Canada (Jegen 2011). 
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3. Institutionalizing the CSS frame 
To which extent has the CSS frame been institutionalized? Long without explicit 
powers over energy, the Commission referred to other competences to materialize a 
European energy policy. Exclusive powers in the field of competition and shared 
powers over the internal market and the environment helped the Commission 
institutionalize its energy policy frame, at least partially. In fact, one could argue that 
the CSS frame originated as much from the Commission’s appraisal of its room for 
maneuver vis-à-vis Member States as from any objective assessment of the energy 
challenges facing Europe by Member States themselves. In this section, I distinguish 
competition, sustainability and security to explore how the Commission used the CSS 
frame to foster both EU-level coordination and domestic-level Europeanization. 
 
3.1 Competitive Energy 
As mentioned above, the Commission began in the mid-1990s to adopt directives to 
liberalize electricity and gas markets, using “competition” as its exclusive treaty 
power and also its internal market competence, which was much strengthened after 
the Single Market Program of the late 1980s. The move from domestic energy 
policies towards European rules was gradual. To push the liberalization process, the 
Commission first established informal structures to bring together state and non-state 
actors to discuss the construction of an internal electricity and gas market. The 
Florence forum for electricity was created in 1998 and participants meet once or 
twice a year. The same holds for the Madrid forum, created in 1999, which deals with 
gas.5 The objective of these forums was to enhance the dialogue between the 
Commission, national actors and market players, but there was no regulatory power 
associated to these meetings. 
The next step was the creation of the Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER) in 2000. CEER regroups the national regulatory agencies. Still informal, it is 
a more institutional venue for regulators as regular meetings facilitate the exchange 
of information. As Thatcher and Coen (2008: 813) note, it reduces “collective action 
problems by having narrower and hence less diverse membership”. Three years 
later, the process was formalized with the creation of the European Regulators Group 
for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), which advises the Commission with regard to 
implementation measures. ERGEG influenced, for example, the drafting of the third 
energy package. Backed by the Commission, it also launched regional initiatives in 
2006 to accelerate the completion of the internal market.6 The latest 
institutionalization move in the field of the internal energy market was the creation of 
ACER. Introduced with the third energy package in 2009, the agency based in 
Ljubljana became fully operational in 2011. It coordinates and complements the 
activities of national regulators, contributes to the establishment of European network 
and market rules, and monitors the functioning of electricity and gas markets as well 
as the work of European networks of transmission system operators (ENTSOs).7 
                                            
5 Participants include the European Commission, Member States governments, national energy regulators, 
transmission system operators (TSOs), electricity traders, power exchanges, network users, and consumers. 
6 http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_ABOUT/ERGEG (accessed January 29, 
2012). 
7 http://www.acer.europa.eu/Pages/ACER.aspx (accessed on December 11, 2014) 
Maya Jegen – Energy policy in the European Union: The power and limits of discourse 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 02/2014 
 
10 
In sum, based on its competition and internal market powers, the Commission started 
an institutionalization process, from informal governance towards new institutions of 
coordination with formal powers. The breaking of trade barriers in the late 1990s was 
followed by vigorous regulatory initiatives. The forums were set up as a venue of 
information exchange, whereas a more powerful ACER centralizes and formalizes 
the network of national regulators and gains independence from Member States’ 
governments (Thatcher and Coen 2008). In parallel, liberalization pressures have 
considerably reshaped domestic markets. For instance, small-business costumers 
can switch their supplier for electricity and gas since 2004, and, in theory, all 
consumers have the same choice since 2007.8 In these two processes, a number of 
stakeholders have at least tacitly supported the Commission’s efforts. There is no 
doubt that the European energy policy frame was followed by real instances of 
Europeanization with respect to its competitive component. One major hurdle, 
however, remains the paucity of infrastructures such as interconnectors. The EU 
recognizes the need for improving the infrastructure to transport energy efficiently to 
where it is needed and for eliminating technical barriers to cross-border trade. This 
points to the importance of institutions in supporting discursive strategies: In contrast 
to market rules, infrastructures are not covered by the EU’s exclusive competence in 
competition policy and shared competence on the internal market.  
 
3.2 Sustainable Energy 
The EU has also emerged as an important actor in the context of the international 
negotiations on climate change. As a regional economic integration organization, it 
ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol, as did Member States. Schreurs, Selin, and VanDeveer (2009) explain the 
EU’s leadership in climate change policy by a combination of actions by “green” 
Member States – Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the UK – as well as initiatives by 
the EU itself. Illustrations of this leadership are, the EU’s “major role in bringing the 
negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol to a successful conclusion, in particular after the 
U.S. withdrawal”, or the fact that the EU, based on Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms, 
pioneered the establishment of a cap-and-trade system for CO2 emission, the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
EU ETS is the most visible example of how the sustainable component of the energy 
policy frame was institutionalized. Ziesing (2009) argues that “the sampling that 
became EU ETS was a product of two failures; first, the European Commission failed 
in its initiative to introduce an effective EU-wide carbon tax in the nineties. Secondly, 
the Commission fought unsuccessfully against the inclusion of trading as a flexible 
instrument in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997”. Whereas the idea of a carbon tax met with 
insurmountable opposition from Member States and industries, the idea of a trading 
system morphed into an opportunity for the Commission: a legal advice stated the 
Commission could ratify the Kyoto Protocol together with the Member States if it 
showed itself capable of contributing to the objectives. EU ETS became an essential 
element for the Commission to prove its qualification (Ziesing 2009). 
EU ETS relies on directive 2003/87/EC. The pilot phase was launched in 2005 and 
was succeeded by phase II (2008-2012), which coincides with the period covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol. Member States decided on the volume of CO2 emissions to be 
                                            
8 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/index_en.htm (accessed January 2012) 
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traded and on the conditions to do so. Member States then allocated allowances to 
their industries and electric utilities. Directive 2009/29/EC amended the previous 
directive and, in its phase III running from 2013 to 2020, EU ETS is being improved 
and extended. The individual allowance of Member States has been centralized at 
the EU level and auctioning – instead of free allocation – is now the default means for 
allocating allowances.9 Besides EU ETS, the creation of the Climate Action 
Directorate-General (DG) in February 2010 can be considered as another 
institutional move. This DG pools climate-change related units from DG Environment, 
together with activities in DG External Relations and DG Enterprise and Industry. 
Climate action and energy are now merged in the Juncker College of 
Commissioners. 
In sum, parallel to the institution building process that took place with respect to the 
competitive component, we observe significant institutionalization with regard to its 
sustainable component. In contrast to competition, climate action is a shared 
competence, like the internal market except that it is more recent and less 
developed. Whereas the internal energy market started out by networks of 
information exchange before moving to more binding policies, climate change policy 
relied early on binding targets. Also, the Commission’s discursive strategy was 
helped by the commitment of some Member States, as well as the lock-in of the EU’s 
negotiation system vis-à-vis climate change. For instance, 30 countries – the 27 
Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway – are involved in EU ETS, which 
covers CO2 emissions from power stations, combustion plants, oil refineries and iron 
and steel work, as well as from most factories. Gradually, the EU succeeded in 
softening Member States resistance to centralizing emission allocation plans.  
 
3.3 Secure Energy 
To some extent, the internal energy market can ensure the securitization of energy 
supplies, for instance, by the development of interconnectors inside Europe, which 
would allow electricity and gas to flow across Member States. However, there is an 
important external dimension to this issue where institutionalization is much more 
timid. In principle, the European Court of Justice (1977) argued that the EU’s internal 
competences could be “projected” externally. The EU launched various initiatives 
with energy content such as the sub-regional energy dialogues with the Maghreb and 
Mashreq under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the European Neighborhood 
Policy. In 2004, a bilateral political dialogue between the EU and the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was set up. Also, the EU sought international 
partnerships with former communist countries such as a dialogue with Russia (2000), 
a Black Sea and Caspian Sea cooperation (2004), the Energy Community South 
East Europe Treaty (2005), as well as partnerships with Ukraine (2005) and 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (2006) (Youngs 2009). Furthermore, in 2007, the 
Network of Energy Security Correspondents (NESCO) was set up to bring together 
central energy stakeholders in Brussels and the Member States; NESCO was 
considered as a “new tool for enhancing EU’s external energy security”.10 
                                            
9 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (accessed December 11, 2014) 
10 http://eeas.europa.eu/energy/network_en.htm (accessed January 29, 2012) 
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In spite of all these initiatives and rhetorical commitments on the part of European 
officials, much less coherent institution building seems to occur. At the time or 
writing, even the conflict in Ukraine, which started a year ago, has not led to 
significant advances in this area. As Baumann and Simmerl (2011: 31) observe, 
“from the European Neighborhood Policy – where it is included into the specific 
action plans – to the actual bilateral forums – e.g. the EU-China Energy Conference 
or the EU-OPEC Energy Dialogue – all these approaches remain a piecemeal 
strategy and are therefore not adequate to form the fundament of a comprehensive 
CEEP Common External Energy Policy. Another important deficit is that all these 
initiatives are not inter-linked and thus possible synergies between them remain 
unused. So while those initiatives are per se desirable, their problem is that they are 
rather ad-hoc and without authority, and hence their added value to the strategic goal 
of increasing the EU’s energy security is quite limited”.  
More importantly, we observe that the interests of Member States remain 
fundamentally heterogeneous: there is little agreement between countries that have 
different energy mixes, different suppliers, and different political allies. When 
compounded with the novelty of the EU’s energy policy competence and the strong 
intergovernmentalist tradition that dominates external relations, it is not surprising 
that the Commission’s discursive strategy has failed to produce tangible effects so 
far. 
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4. Does the CSS frame resonate among policy makers? 
As we have seen, European actors have been rhetorically pushing a common energy 
policy based on competitive, sustainable and secure components. Some of these 
ideas and rhetoric are substantiated in institutions: this is the case with regard to the 
internal market and sustainability (i.e. climate change), but less so when it comes to 
a common external energy policy. In this section, I look at the reception of the 
Commission’s discursive strategy by national policy makers.  
Although Member States adopted stepwise the three energy packages, the energy 
and climate package, and various directives and strategies with respect to 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy, it is not clear that Member States 
assess the three different components in the same manner. Fieldwork in Germany, 
Poland and France hints at a different interpretation of the common European energy 
policy among Member States. In Germany, where the market is reasonably 
competitive and supplies fairly diversified, energy policy is increasingly understood as 
an environmental issue. In Poland, by contrast, the security of supplies is a priority. 
While paid lip service, liberalization and environmental concerns are seen as 
constraints rather than drivers. With regard to France, its energy and climate policy 
objectives seem – at least on a general level – to match European goals. 
 
4.1 Germany: enhancing climate policy 
Germany is the largest economy in the EU and the fifth largest in the world. 
Compared to other modern economies, Germany still has an important industrial 
sector (25% of GDP). The German energy portfolio is relatively balanced with more 
than one-third of oil, 24% of coal, 23% of natural gas, 12% of nuclear and about 5% 
of renewable energy. Over the last decades, the energy mix has changed: compared 
to 1985, coal dropped by 40% and natural gas increased by 13%. Renewable energy 
– biomass, solar, wind and geothermal – experienced an average annual growth rate 
of 10.1% since 1995. Over 60% of German energy needs is imported (IEA 2007: 15-
16). The “Big Four” – E.ON, EnBW, RWE and Vattenfallen – dominate the electricity 
market with three-quarters of the electricity production. The high-pressure gas 
system is controlled by five companies – E.ON, Ruhrgas, Wingas, VNG/Ontras, BEB 
and RWE – but 750 local gas companies are operating at the municipal level. In 
general, they are owned partly by the municipalities, partly by the big firms mentioned 
(IEA 2007: 30). 
Germany also has an important environmental movement and the Green Party, in a 
red-green coalition with the Social Democrats, was in power from 1998-2005. 
Concerns of sustainable development such as the Renewable Energies Act (2000) or 
the decision to phase out nuclear energy were set on the political agenda during this 
period. Meanwhile Germany has become a leader in the development of renewable 
energy, notably wind energy, and its renewable technologies are among the most 
competitive worldwide. The nuclear accident in Fukushima in 2011 and the decision 
to phase-out nuclear power has accelerated Germany’s energy transition. Thus, it 
comes as no surprise that Germany seeks to pursue a progressive sustainable policy 
on the European level, too: the sustainable – or climate change component – of 
energy policy within the EU is seen as very important: combating climate change 
implies reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels. The emphasis is on 
indigenous, renewable energy sources. The Kyoto process is seen as the catalyst for 
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the common European climate change activity and all German interviewees pointed 
to the key role Germany played with regard to climate change in the EU. Angela 
Merkel is seen as the “Climate Chancellor”, who anchored climate-relevant issues as 
renewable energy and energy efficiency on the EU agenda during the 2007 EU 
presidency (while fighting skeptical industries at the domestic level). 
The third dimension of the CSS frame, by contrast, does not seem to resonate much 
among German officials. From the German side, it is clear that private companies are 
the key players with regard to the internal energy market, but also with respect to 
international relations: it is up to German firms to close energy deals with their foreign 
counterparts. Even if the German government wanted to regroup the different 
interests of energy companies, it would not know how to do so. All German 
interviewees emphasized that German energy companies’ interests do not 
necessarily coincide with the priorities of the German government. It would seem 
even more difficult for the European Commission to regroup these different interests 
and speak with one voice to Gazprom, for example. A diplomat argued that it might 
be useful to speak with one voice, especially with Russia, but he immediately added 
that Member States should not be restrained from concluding bilateral agreements. 
Thus, it seems that the fairly liberal state of the German energy market partly 
undermines attempts to create a strong external policy.  
An expert on EU energy policy assesses that Member States from Central Europe 
need a common external energy policy with regard to supply security, whereas 
Western Member States and, the big ones in particular, only have a limited interest. 
In that sense, Germany subscribes to the spirit of solidarity evoked by the Lisbon 
Treaty, but circumscribes it when it comes to the funding of infrastructures. Again, the 
argument is that this is private companies’ business: firms should take the profits, but 
also bear the risks. There is no impetus to ask for more EU activity. Germany’s 
position has been reiterated recently, when the Polish Prime Minister Tusk proposed 
a Europe-wide energy union, including the idea of a centralized purchase of gas 
supplies. Angela Merkel supported the idea in principle, but was skeptical about the 
implementation of a common contract scheme because it would contradict EU’s effort 
to deregulate energy markets.11 
 
4.2 Poland: securing energy supplies 
One of the Polish interviewees described Poland as “the largest amongst the poorest 
within the EU with a lot of aspirations”, but also as “the poorest among the largest”, 
meaning that because of its economic weakness it is not able to impact Germany, 
France or the UK as much as it would like to. Poland relies heavily on its domestic 
resources to secure its energy supply. Polish coal accounts for 55% of its primary 
energy supply and for 90% of electricity generation. 95% of its crude oil demand and 
about two-thirds of its gas demand are imported, whereof 94% of oil imports and over 
80% of gas imports come from Russia (IEA 2011: 9-10). In addition, according to the 
OECD, “Poland is the OECD country where the grip of the state on the economy is 
the tightest, and privatization was largely stopped in the mid-2000s” (OECD 2010: 9). 
This is reflected in the energy sector where, for instance, the Polish Oil and Gas 
Company PGNiG controls 98% of the gas sector (Buchan 2010: 50). The electricity 
sector is dominated by an oligopoly, and there are two major oil companies that are 
                                            
11 http://www.ecfr.eu/blog/entry/polish_initiative_for_an_energy_union (accessed December 15, 2014 
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not state-owned, but where the State Treasury is an important stakeholder and 
defines the policies.12  
The concentrated energy portfolio and dependence vis-à-vis Russia explain why 
energy security is vital and why the climate change approach is a genuine challenge 
to Polish energy policy. It also explains why the Commission’s CSS frame is 
interpreted differently than in Germany. Whereas Germans emphasize climate 
change in the CSS frame before competition and security, Poles give priority to 
security. As a Polish energy expert sums up: “If you look at Polish issues, than you 
can definitely put the supply issue at the top, it is the priority: how to make us less 
vulnerable to any potential problems with the supply from the East. Then, recently, 
the climate issue that emerged not as an opportunity, but as a challenge because of 
our coal dependence. Lastly, it’s the market issue, which is still on the bottom of the 
Polish debate although, for the Commission, it is one of the corner stones”. Indeed, 
the competitive component of the CSS frame is clearly the least important in Poland: 
“Electricity and gas markets are still dominated by incumbent companies, and 
competition is limited, particularly in the gas market” (IEA 2011: 13).  
The Polish concern for energy security was highlighted in public in 2006 when the 
Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz proposed to EU and NATO partners a 
treaty on energy security. Against the background of the Russian gas cut-off to 
Ukraine, which affected several EU Member States, the idea behind the treaty was 
based on the “musketeer principle”: “All for one – one for all”: if one of the members 
of such a treaty faces shortages of supply, the others should feel compelled to help 
out (Marcinkiewicz 2006). Shaped by the Russian legacy, the proposal mirrored 
Polish fears of a powerful neighbor and advocated a clause of mutual assistance in 
case of energy disruptions. At least on a symbolic level, Polish security concerns met 
with a positive response. The Lisbon Treaty adopted in 2009 includes a reference to 
the spirit of solidarity between Member States to ensure security of energy supply in 
the Union as well as to the promotion of the interconnection of energy networks; 
moreover, in the context of rising tensions with Russia over Ukraine, President 
Juncker has begun to stress the project of an Energy Union (“We need to pool our 
resources, combine our infrastructures and unite our negotiating power with third 
countries”13). This however does not answer the immediate energy problem of 
Poland, as summarized by a energy expert: “The problem is that countries like 
Poland and others from Central Europe are vulnerable here and now and not in 20 
or 30 years from now”. 
Conversely, it is the sustainable component of the CSS frame that poses a significant 
challenge to Poland. Whereas indigenous coal is the pillar of its energy security 
strategy, European efforts to reduce CO2 emissions without an international 
agreement run against the competitiveness of Polish industry: “The problem is not 
the level of ambition, the problem is competitiveness of the industry and carbon 
leakage”, says a senior official. When negotiating the climate-energy package, 
Poland bargained hard and obtained some compromise. Poorer Member States will 
receive more emissions permits to auction, which will allow them to generate 
revenues from selling allowances. Moreover, Poland (and 9 other Member States) 
                                            
12 Author interview April 2010 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/index_en.htm (accessed December 15, 2014) 
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can apply for reduced, gradually rising auctioning rates in power production. These 
measures, it is hoped, should facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy.14 
 
4.3 France: Pursuing French policies within Europe 
France has pursued a strong nuclear energy policy since the 1970 oil crises. In 2008, 
France generated 77% of its electricity from nuclear power. Although most of its oil 
and gas and all coal is imported, imports are diversified and France is a net exporter 
of electricity (IEA 2010: 15-17). Due to the importance of nuclear energy, France’s 
economy is one of the least CO2 intensive among industrialized countries. Following 
the adoption of the directives on the internal energy market, France disengaged 
somewhat from its traditional state monopolies, but the “French government still has 
significant stakes in GDF Suez (35.6%) and EDF (84.8%)” (IEA 2010: 16). This 
means that the positions of GDF and EDF are still quite dominant, that market prices 
and regulated tariffs coexist, and that consumers hardly take advantage of the 
internal market. 
France’s energy policy relies on four objectives: security of energy supply, 
competitive energy supply, sustainable energy development, and equal level of 
energy service to everyone. These objectives are mirrored in the 2005 Energy Law15, 
which includes targets to reduce CO2 emission, to promote renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. French objectives match fairly well with the CSS frame, or as a 
French expert explains “the [European] discourse is convenient for the French. Take 
the 2005 Law where we have these four objectives. There is an environmental policy 
objective, the reduction of CO2 emissions, but there is also an objective of security of 
supply, and an objective of having energy access at a low price. The idea that energy 
policy serves different objectives is not at all incongruent with our approach.”  
Two other examples illustrate the issue linkage in France in terms of sustainable 
development: The Grenelle de l’environnement, an initiative including political 
meetings between state and non-state actors, was launched by Nicolas Sarkozy in 
2007 and resulted, among others, in different pieces of legislation which define sector 
specific targets (e.g. building energy improvements, environment friendly 
organization of transport). Second, and also in 2007, different ministries were 
integrated into the new Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and 
Housing in an attempt to enhance its status and to assign it to a Minister of State. 
France was proactive during its EU presidency in 2008 and pushed through the 
energy and climate package in a record time. Despite rocky relations with the 
Greens, President Hollande has raised the stakes with the organization of COP 21 in 
Paris, scheduled for 2015 and which is meant to be a high point of his tenure. 
A French official makes clear that France wants an integrated energy policy 
approach addressing all topics to avoid a perceived drift towards a European energy 
policy that would address only market issues. This is where the French nuance on 
the CSS frame comes in: even though France supported all three energy packages 
and is in favor of the internal market, it does not entirely share the (Anglo-Saxon) 
conception of liberalization promoted by the Commission. Again the French official: 
                                            
14 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/107136.pdf (accessed January 29, 
201) 
15http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=F23F8912E2543DC7AB0435B14FDABD9F.tpdjo13v_3?
cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000813253&dateTexte= (accessed January 29, 2012) 
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“We are not against opening up to competition, but we don’t think that it is enough 
just to liberalize the market in order to make it work (…). We don’t translate security 
of supply and competitiveness solely into the break up of big energy companies”. In 
other words, the competition dimension of the CSS frame resonates in France, 
although the conception of liberalization and competitiveness is perceived somewhat 
differently in Paris and in Brussels. 
Finally, France perceives the need of a common external energy policy with regard to 
supply security in a similar way as Germany. France has a large diplomatic service, 
which deals with all issues, including with energy policy. Like Germany, France has 
energy firms capable of negotiating contracts on their own with foreign suppliers. As 
a French official sums up: “Our companies make deals with their partners. We don’t 
want to interfere and we certainly don’t want the Commission to interfere”. 
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Conclusion  
This comparison between Germany, Poland and France helps elucidate both the 
conditions for success and the limitations of a discursive strategy. Despite the lack of 
a formal mandate, the Commission has managed over the past 20 years to expand 
its power in the field of energy policy. It has done so by developing a discursive 
strategy that became progressively accepted by policy actors and led to some 
institutionalization. The success of the CSS frame is largely based on its polysemic 
nature. Much like in the case of the Single Market Program of the 1980s (Jabko 
2006), the Commission has skillfully manipulated a strategic repertoire of ideas 
linking the free circulation of services and competition with the environment and 
external security. This seemingly coherent discourse is what allows the CSS frame to 
resonate with different categories of actors in different Member States, from 
environmentalists to nuclear producers, and from conservative politicians to liberal 
economists. To a large extent, the CSS frame has been seized and “used” by policy 
actors in their everyday discourse, both at the EU and at the national level (Jacquot 
and Woll 2008). Of course, each of these actors has his way of establishing a 
hierarchy between the different elements of the frame. Natorski and Herranz 
Surrallés (2008) make the same finding within the Commission itself, where different 
DGs naturally have different priorities when it comes to energy policy.  
But, as I argued, this productive discursive strategy has also reached important 
limits. The Commission’s energy policy frame faces different material situations. 
Rather than focusing only on ideas, the model I proposed includes three elements to 
understand the effectiveness of a discursive strategy: the Commission’s framing 
(ideas), the Member State’s energy situation (interests), and the existence of an EU 
regulatory space (institutions). The Commission’s framing was most effective when it 
was harnessed to the Commission’s strongly institutionalized competence, whether 
because it is exclusive vis-à-vis Member States (competition) or because it is well 
established (internal market). Although less institutionalized at the EU level, the 
sustainability dimension also made some progress because it had a strong 
resonance with some member state interests. Security, however, is a component of 
the frame that, even though it strongly resonates with public perceptions, especially 
in countries such as Poland, cannot rely on formal institutions or the interests of large 
states. As a result, it has remained the poor relation of the EU’s energy policy even 
after relations with Russia soured around the conflict in Ukraine. In that regard, I 
concur with Natorski and Herranz Surrallés (2008) but for different reasons: it is not 
the content of the CSS framing that is problematic, but its lack of institutional and 
material support. 
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